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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This proceeding is before us pursuant to 2 U.S.C.S 437h, 
which channels constitutional challenges to the Federal 
Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. S 431 et seq. ("FECA"), as 
amended, directly to the en banc Court of Appeals. The 
present challenge was filed in the District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania by Renato P. Mariani. A 
criminal indictment pending in that court charges Mariani 
and other officers of Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc., and 
Danella Environmental Technologies, Inc., with violating 
the FECA, 2 U.S.C. SS 441b(a) and 441f, by making 
campaign contributions to a number of candidates for 
federal office through enlisting company employees and 
others to forward contributions to the candidates that were 
thereafter reimbursed by one of the companies. Mariani 
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argues that SS 441b(a) and 441f violate the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 
Mariani's principal argument regards "soft money," or 
funds lawfully raised by national and congressional political 
party organizations for party-building activities from 
corporations, labor unions, and individuals who have 
reached their federal direct contribution limits. Soft money 
is sometimes used to fund so-called "issue advocacy," 
advertisements that advocate a candidate's positions or 
criticize his opponents without specifically urging viewers to 
vote for or defeat the candidate. Issue ads are often only 
marginally distinguishable from ads directly supporting a 
candidate, which corporations cannot lawfully fund under 
the FECA. 
 
Mariani contends that S 441b(a), which proscribes 
corporate contributions made directly to candidates for 
federal office, has been completely undermined by the 
staggering increase in recent years of the amount of 
corporate soft money donations. In Mariani's submission, 
this avalanche of soft money has made S 441b(a) so 
underinclusive, and so incapable of materially advancing 
the intended purpose of the federal election statute, that it 
must be struck down. Alternatively, because the bellwether 
cases in this area, including Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (per curiam), validate statutes limiting  campaign 
contributions, but not banning them outright, and 
recognize that corporate speech is protected under the First 
Amendment, see First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765 (1978), Mariani challenges the total ban on 
direct corporate contributions as inconsistent with the First 
Amendment. Mariani also challenges the constitutionality of 
S 441f, which prohibits making campaign contributions in 
the name of another to a candidate for federal elective 
office. 
 
The Supreme Court has construed S 437h so that, if a 
district court concludes that a challenge to the FECA is 
frivolous, the court may dismiss the case without certifying 
it. See California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 
453 U.S. 182, 193-94 n.14 (1981). The District Court 
concluded that the challenge to S 441b(a) was not frivolous, 
made comprehensive findings, and certified Mariani's 
 
                                4 
  
challenge to this Court. Section 437h, as construed by the 
Supreme Court, required the District Court to make fact 
findings. Many of the District Court's findings were 
stipulated to by the parties and are uncontested. The 
government and the Federal Election Commission ("FEC"), 
however, assail other findings and the Court's 21 ultimate 
findings of fact as being excessive or beyond its powers. 
They also argue that a number of them, including the 
ultimate findings, are unsupported by the record. Our 
review of the District Court's findings, made in a setting 
outside the traditional adversary crucible, is not deferential. 
As we note in section II, we agree that some of the District 
Court's findings are unsupported by proper evidence and 
that some stray from appropriate fact finding into legal 
conclusions. But even assuming that the role of soft money 
is that asserted by Mariani and found by the District Court, 
we conclude that the record could not support a holding 
that S 441b(a) violates the First Amendment. 
 
The government and the FEC not only defend the 
constitutionality of SS 441b(a) and 441f, but contend that 
Mariani's challenges are legally frivolous and thus never 
should have been certified to the en banc court. They also 
submit that the District Court employed an insufficiently 
stringent standard for measuring frivolousness. We are 
satisfied that the District Court did not apply an incorrect 
standard of legal frivolousness and that it acted correctly in 
not dismissing the case without certifying it, at least with 
respect to the challenges to S 441b(a), for which it made an 
independent assessment of frivolousness. Though the 
District Court did not make an independent assessment of 
the frivolousness of the challenge to S 441f as it should 
have, the government does not challenge the lack of an 
independent assessment here, and because the pending 
criminal case awaits a determination of this action, we will 
reach the challenges to S 441f without remanding for such 
a determination. 
 
Although not legally frivolous, Mariani's challenge to 
S 441b(a) fails. As we explain in detail, both the 
underinclusiveness and outright ban challenges are 
interred by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area. 
See especially Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 
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U.S. 652 (1990), and Federal Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right 
to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982). Although Mariani's 
factual portrayal of the impact of soft money on 
contemporary elections is impressive, it falls short. Section 
441b(a) is not fatally underinclusive under our precedents, 
because we cannot say that there is no meaningful 
distinction between hard and soft money. We cannot 
exchange our robes for togas; any reform in this area must 
be sought from Congress. 
 
Finally, we conclude that the challenge to S 441f is 
patently without merit. Accordingly we shall enter judgment 
in favor of the government. 
 
I. Procedural History 
 
In October 1997, the United States filed an indictment 
charging Mariani and several other individuals with, inter 
alia, violating the FECA. That action, United States v. 
Mariani, No. 3:CR-97-225, is pending before the District 
Court. The indictment charges that between August 1994 
and December 1996, Mariani and other officers and 
employees of Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. ("Empire") and 
Danella Environmental Technologies, Inc. ("Danella") 
solicited numerous employees of the corporations, as well 
as business associates, friends, and family members, to 
make contributions to the campaigns of designated 
candidates for federal election. According to the indictment, 
these contributions were reimbursed either directly or 
indirectly by Empire. The indictment also alleges that 
Mariani and other officers and employees at Empire and 
Danella made individual contributions to these federal 
candidates, which were also reimbursed by Empire. 
 
More particularly, the indictment alleges that in April 
1995, Mariani and other officers and employees of Empire 
and Danella contacted employees, associates, friends and 
family members in an effort to raise funds for the New 
Jersey Steering Committee, a state fundraising arm of the 
Robert Dole campaign for President. Contributors allegedly 
were asked to write personal checks in amounts of $1,000 
(or, in the case of couples, $2,000) and were reimbursed 
with Empire corporate funds. It is also alleged that on April 
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29, 1995, Mariani and another defendant in the criminal 
case, Michael Serafini, attended a Steering Committee 
luncheon at which they handed an envelope containing the 
contributions to Dole campaign officials. When the Dole 
campaign reported the contributions to the Federal Election 
Commission ("FEC"), its filing allegedly attributed these 
$80,000 worth of contributions to the individual 
contributors, rather than to Empire. The Dole contributions 
came approximately ten days prior to a vote in the Senate 
on the Interstate Transportation of Municipal Waste bill, in 
which Empire and Danella were interested. Dole was the 
Senate majority leader at the time. 
 
The indictment charges Mariani (and others) with 
violations of 2 U.S.C. SS 441b(a) and 441f. Section 441b(a) 
of the FECA prohibits any corporation from making any 
contribution in connection with any campaign for federal 
office and renders it unlawful for any officer of a 
corporation to consent to any prohibited corporate 
contribution. Section 441f of the FECA, the conduit 
contribution ban or "anti-conduit" provision, prohibits one 
from making a contribution "in the name of another 
person" or "knowingly permit[ting] his name to be used to 
effect such a contribution." 2 U.S.C. S 441f. Mariani moved 
to dismiss the FECA charges in the indictment and 
simultaneously filed this action against the United States 
seeking declaratory relief pursuant to 2 U.S.C.S 437h. The 
FEC was granted leave to intervene as a defendant. 
 
Section 437h provides that 
 
       any individual eligible to vote in any election for the 
       office of President may institute such actions in the 
       appropriate district court of the United States, 
       including actions for declaratory judgment, as may be 
       appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any 
       provision of [FECA]. The district court immediately 
       shall certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act 
       to the United States court of appeals for the circuit 
       involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc. 
 
2 U.S.C. S 437h.1 The Supreme Court has construed S 437h 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It is uncontested that Mariani meets the voter eligibility requirement. 
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so that, if a plaintiff brings a claim that is frivolous, a 
district court may dismiss the case without certifying it. See 
California Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 
182, 193-94 n.14 (1981). The Supreme Court also has 
interpreted S 437h to require the district court to develop a 
record and make findings of fact sufficient to allow the en 
banc court of appeals to decide the constitutional issues. 
See Bread Political Action Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 
455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) ("[T]he District Court, as required 
by S 437h, first made findings of fact and then certified the 
case . . . ."). The District Court concluded that the 
challenge to S 441b(a) was not frivolous, and that the 
interests of judicial economy "militated against" a separate 
determination that the challenge to S 441f was not 
frivolous. See Mariani v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 352, 
355 (M.D. Pa. 1999). The District Court then made 
comprehensive findings and certified the challenge to this 
Court. 
 
II. The District Court's Findings of Fact 
 
Some of the District Court's findings are disputed, are 
unsupported by proper evidence, or go beyond appropriate 
fact finding into legal conclusion. For example, an opinion 
expressed by the New York Times Editorial page that one 
individual's experiences with the Democratic National 
Committee "deepen the cynicism of Americans" is not a 
proper evidentiary source for a finding that Americans have 
become more cynical about government as a result of the 
role of soft money in the political system.2 See Mariani v. 
United States, 80 F. Supp.2d. 352, 412 (M.D. Pa. 1999). 
Similarly, the very title of the segment of thefindings called 
"Due to the Effects of Soft Money on the Political System, 
FECA is not Serving the Goals it was Intended to Serve," id. 
at 418, as well as the finding that "[m]ost issue ads are 
financed in large part with soft money . . . from sources 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Johnny Chung, the individual referred to in the editorial, stated in an 
interview with NBC News anchor Tom Brokaw that he was solicited to 
make contributions to the Democratic National Committee in exchange 
for invitations to meetings at which he could meet government officials 
and discuss business concerns. 
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and in amounts that the FECA was meant to prohibit," id. 
at 377, demonstrate that the fact-finding effort sometimes 
metamorphosed into conclusions regarding the legal issues 
in this case. Id. at 418-19. Given the unique procedural 
posture of the case, we need not (and do not) defer to such 
findings in our analysis. Although some of the District 
Court's findings went beyond what was proper both as a 
matter of evidence and by crossing the line into forming 
legal conclusions, the court compiled an impressive factual 
showing that soft money plays an increasingly large role in 
federal elections. 
 
Contributions made to or expenditures made on behalf of 
candidates for federal elective office are referred to as "hard 
money." Under S 441b(a), corporations are not permitted to 
make contributions of hard money to campaigns for federal 
office. Corporations can, however, make contributions to 
political parties in unlimited amounts. These contributions, 
which are referred to as "soft money," can be used to fund 
"issue advocacy." "Issue advocacy" includes advertisements 
or other campaign materials that advocate positions 
supported by a candidate, often comparing those positions 
with those of an opponent, without directly advocating the 
election of the candidate. Donors of soft money are able to 
avoid the FECA contribution limits and disclosure 
requirements applicable to hard money and direct 
advocacy. The amount of soft money contributed in each 
election cycle has grown tremendously in the last two 
decades, from about $19 million in 1980 to more than $260 
million in 1996.3 Soft money donations by the 544 largest 
public and private companies more than tripled between 
1992 and 1996. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. During the 1995-96 election year cycle, the Republican national party 
committees (the Republican National Committee, the National 
Republican Senatorial Committee, and the National Republican 
Congressional Committee) raised approximately $138.2 million in soft 
money and the Democratic national party committees (the Democratic 
National Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 
and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee) raised 
approximately $123.9 million in soft money. (The term "election cycle" 
refers to the period from January 1 of the year preceding the election 
through December 31 of the year during which the election occurs). 
Corporations were major contributors of these funds. 
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With respect to Mariani's challenge, the parties agree on 
the following facts. Candidates for federal elective office 
help their parties raise soft money. Candidates who raise 
large amounts of soft money often receive more support 
from their party than candidates who are less effective at 
raising soft money. Committee officials often act as 
intermediaries between donors and candidates. 
 
Soft money is used to fund (or partially fund) issue 
advocacy that, on occasion, is hard to distinguish from 
direct advocacy for a particular candidate for federal office. 
Campaigns sometimes coordinate with outside entities 
regarding these ads. These ads promote or criticize federal 
candidates in order to influence the outcome of elections, 
although avoiding words of direct advocacy such as"vote 
for," "elect," or "defeat."4 
 
Corporations play an important role in campaignfinance. 
Candidates for federal elective office often know which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The following ads aired in the 1995-95 election cycle illustrate this 
proposition. The Republican National Committee financed the following 
ad: 
 
       ANNOUNCER: Three years ago Bill Clinton gave us the largest tax 
       increase in history, including a 4 cent a gallon increase on 
gasoline. 
       Bill Clinton said he felt bad about it. 
 
       CLINTON: People in this room are still mad at me over the budget 
       because you think I raised your taxes too much. It might surprise 
       you to know I think I raised them too much, too. 
 
       ANNOUNCER: OK, Mr. President, We are surprised. So now, 
       surprise us again. Support Senator Dole's plan to repeal your gas 
       tax. And learn that actions . . . do speak louder than words. 
 
The Democratic National Committee financed the following issue ad: 
 
       ANNOUNCER: American Values. Do our duty to our parents. 
       President Clinton protects Medicare. The Dole/Gingrich budget tried 
       to cut Medicare $270 Billion. 
 
       Protect families. President Clinton cut taxes for millions of 
working 
       families. The Dole/Gingrich budget tried to raise taxes on 8 
million 
       of them. Opportunity. President Clinton proposes tax breaks for 
       tuition. The Dole/Gingrich budget tried to slash college 
       scholarships. Only President Clinton's plan meets our challenges, 
       protects our values. 
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corporations are large contributors of soft money. Because 
there are no limits on soft money contributions, soft money 
is easier to raise than hard money. Soft money 
contributions of corporate treasury funds can result in 
access (and thus a forum to express their interests) for 
corporate officials to high government officials, including 
elected officials, as well as to candidates for federal elective 
office. Large and repeat donors sometime get more access 
than other donors, and donating soft money can be a more 
effective means for getting access than hard money. 
Corporate soft money contributions enable corporations to 
some extent to circumvent the corporate hard money 
contribution ban and support (indirectly) candidates for 
federal elective office. 
 
Corporations are solicited for and give large sums of soft 
money in federal elections; according to reportsfiled with 
the FEC, during the 1994 and 1998 election cycles, 
corporations donated more than 50 percent of all itemized 
soft money contributions. Additionally, in the 1995-95 
election cycle, corporations in industries in which 
legislation was contemplated gave large sums of soft money. 
 
III. The Test for Frivolousness 
 
In California Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 453 
U.S. 182, 193-94 n.14 (1981), the Supreme Court stated 
that "we do not construe S 437h to require certification of 
constitutional claims that are frivolous." The Court cited 
with approval a district court decision from an in forma 
pauperis action that employed the standard from the in 
forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2)(B), to 
determine whether a challenge to FECA was frivolous. See 
id. at 193-94 n. 14 (citing Gifford v. Congress, 452 F. Supp. 
802 (E.D. Cal. 1978)). The in forma pauperis statute 
authorizes a district court to dismiss sua sponte any action 
that it determines to be legally frivolous. An action is not 
frivolous under the statute where the complaint raises an 
arguable question of law that ultimately will be resolved 
against the plaintiff. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 
(1989). The District Court applied the standard for 
frivolousness set forth in Neitzke and certified Mariani's 
challenge to the en banc Court of Appeals after concluding 
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that "it cannot be said that the constitutional challenges 
are plainly foreclosed by existing precedent." Mariani v. 
United States, No.3 CV-98-1701 (March 25, 1999). 
 
The government and the FEC argue that the District 
Court should have used a more exacting standard for 
frivolousness and rejected Mariani's challenge. They submit 
that the correct standard is that set forth by the Ninth 
Circuit in Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247, 1257 
(9th Cir. 1990), which viewed the role of the District Court 
as akin to that of a single judge deciding a motion to 
convene a three-judge court to hear a constitutional 
challenge and noted that this standard is closer to the 
standard used to review a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6) than it is to the in forma pauperis standard. 
 
We need not decide which standard applies, because 
under either standard Mariani's claim is not frivolous. As 
the Ninth Circuit noted, a genuinely new variation on an 
issue raised under a particular section of the FECA that 
already has been challenged and upheld may give rise to a 
nonfrivolous challenge to that section: "[o]nce a core 
provision of FECA has been reviewed and approved by the 
courts, unanticipated variations also may deserve the full 
attention of the appellate court. At the same time, not every 
sophistic twist that arguably presents a `new' question 
should be certified." Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d at 
1257; see also Khachaturian v. FEC, 980 F.2d 330, 331 
(5th Cir. 1992). Mariani's challenge to S 441b(a) is not 
simply a sophistic twist, but can fairly be characterized as 
a new challenge based on the rise in importance in 
campaign finance of soft money and issue advocacy. 
Moreover, the facial validity of the statute never has been 
squarely determined by the Supreme Court. 
 
The District Court did not make an independent 
assessment of the frivolousness of the challenge toS 441f. 
Hereafter, district courts considering challenges to separate 
provisions of the FECA should make the required 
determination regarding frivolousness for each of the 
challenges.5 However, because the government does not 
challenge the lack of an independent assessment here, and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. That determination is best made initially by District Courts. 
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because the pending criminal case awaits a determination 
of this action, we will reach the challenges toS 441f without 
remanding for a determination regarding frivolousness. 
 
IV. The Challenge to S 441b(a) 
 
Section 441b(a) bans corporations and unions from using 
funds from their corporate treasuries to contribute to or 
make expenditures in connection with any campaign for 
federal office. See 2 U.S.C. S 441b(a). In Fed. Elec. Comm'n 
v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1982), 
the Supreme Court chronicled the history of S 441b(a): 
 
       Seventy-five years ago Congress first made financial 
       contributions to federal candidates by corporations 
       illegal by enacting the Tillman Act, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). 
       Within the next few years Congress went further and 
       required financial disclosure by federal candidates 
       following election, Act of July 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 822, 
       and the following year required pre-election disclosure 
       as well. Act of August 19, 1911, 37 Stat. 25. The 
       Federal Corrupt Practices Act, passed in 1925, 
       extended the prohibition against corporate 
       contributions to include "anything of value," and made 
       acceptance of a corporate contribution as well as the 
       giving of such a contribution a crime. 43 Stat. 1070. 
 
        The first restrictions on union contributions were 
       contained in the second Hatch Act, 54 Stat. 767 
       (1940), and later, in the War Labor Disputes Act of 
       1943, 57 Stat. 167, union contributions in connection 
       with federal elections were prohibited altogether. These 
       prohibitions on union political activity were extended 
       and strengthened in the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 
       (1947), which broadened the earlier prohibition against 
       contributions to "expenditures" as well. Congress 
       codified most of these provisions in the Federal 
       Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, and 
       enacted later amendments in 1974, 88 Stat. 1263, and 
       in 1976, 90 Stat. 475. 
 
Under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 22 (1976) (per 
curiam), it is clear that spending for political campaigns is 
protected speech that implicates both the right to free 
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expression and the right of free association. Moreover, 
because there is "no support in the First or Fourteenth 
Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the 
proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the 
protection of the First Amendment loses that protection 
simply because its source is a corporation," First Nat'l Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1977), the ban on 
corporate contributions under S 441b(a) is subject to the 
same level of scrutiny as other regulations limiting 
spending for political campaigns. In Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
16, the Court held that limitations on spending for 
campaigns should be subjected to "exacting scrutiny": "this 
Court has never suggested that the dependence of a 
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself 
to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting 
scrutiny required by the First Amendment." The Court 
added that the First Amendment guarantee "has its fullest 
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of 
campaigns for political office." Id. at 15 (citing Monitor 
Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
 
Buckley, of course, distinguished campaign contributions 
from direct expenditures, striking down a limit on 
expenditures while upholding a limit on campaign 
contributions. As the Court's recent decision in Nixon v. 
Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 120 S.Ct. 897, 904 (2000) (citing 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21), explains, in the area of 
contributions, even under the exacting scrutiny standard, 
"limiting contributions [leaves] communication significantly 
unimpaired." "[U]nder Buckley's standard of scrutiny, a 
contribution limit involving `significant interference' with 
associational rights could survive if the government 
demonstrated that contribution regulation was `closely 
drawn' to match a `sufficiently important interest.' " Shrink 
Missouri, 120 S.Ct. at 904 (citation omitted). Accordingly, in 
considering Mariani's challenge to S 441b(a), while we treat 
campaign contributions from the corporate treasury as 
speech and subject the ban on them in S 441b(a) to 
exacting scrutiny, we do so against a background principle 
that limits on contributions--though not necessarily bans 
on contributions--can withstand this scrutiny if they are 
" `closely drawn' to match a `sufficiently important 
interest.' " 
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The District Court certified two issues regardingS 441b(a) 
to this Court. The first is whether the prohibition in 
S 441b(a) on contributions by corporations from corporate 
treasuries to candidates for federal elective office is 
unconstitutional on its face. The second is whether the 
prohibition in S 441b(a) on contributions by corporations 
from corporate treasuries to candidates for federal office, in 
the context of the presently existing law that otherwise 
permits corporations to expend unlimited amounts of 
corporate funds to influence the outcome of federal 
elections (via soft money contributions), violates the First 
Amendment. 
 
A. The Constitutionality of S 441b(a) on its Face 
 
In considering the $1,000 contribution limit at issue in 
Buckley, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of the 
right to association through support of the candidate of 
one's choice: 
 
       [T]he primary first amendment problem raised by the 
       Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one 
       aspect of the contributor's freedom of political 
       association . . . [T]he right of association is a `basic 
       constitutional freedom,' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 
       57, that is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a 
       right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of 
       a free society." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 
       (1960). In view of the fundamental nature of the right 
       to associate, governmental "action which may have the 
       effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject 
       to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama , [357 U.S.] 
       at 460-461. 
 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25 (internal citations partially 
omitted). 
 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the $1,000 limit 
was constitutional. The Court identified two principal 
reasons for upholding the limit. First, the Court recognized 
a strong governmental interest in deterring corruption and 
the appearance of corruption in campaign finance, 
particularly from large contributions. Id. at 28; see also id. 
at 30 ("Congress was justified in concluding that the 
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interest in safeguarding against the appearance of 
impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse 
 
inherent in the process of raising large monetary 
contributions be eliminated."). Second, the Court concluded 
that the $1,000 limit was narrowly tailored insofar as it still 
permitted individual donors to register their political 
preferences in a substantial way, reasoning that the 
expressive value of the contribution lies in the act of 
contributing rather than the amount given. See id. at 21. 
Accordingly, Buckley seems to leave open the question 
whether an outright ban on campaign contributions--such 
as that found in S 441b(a)--would pass constitutional 
muster. 
 
The government and the FEC argue that, even if Buckley 
left the door open for a constitutional challenge to an 
outright ban, Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to 
Work Comm, 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (hereinafter NRWC), 
slammed the door shut. In NRWC, the Supreme Court 
addressed indirectly the issue of limiting direct corporate 
contributions to candidates. There, the Court upheld 
federal restrictions upon corporate solicitation of campaign 
funds from individuals found in a subsection ofS 441b- 
441b(b)(4)(c)--that prohibits nonstock corporations from 
soliciting funds to be used for political purposes (through a 
separate segregated fund) from people who are not 
members of the corporation. See id. at 198 n.1, 205-11. 
 
Subsection 441b(b)(4)(c) permits corporations to make 
limited campaign contributions from separate segregated 
funds solicited explicitly for that purpose. See id. at 201-02. 
In upholding the statute, the Court suggested that 
Congress could prohibit direct contributions by 
corporations to candidates for public office, stating that 
 
       The first purpose of S 441b, the government states, is 
       to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth 
       amassed by the special advantages which go with the 
       corporate form of organization should not be converted 
       into political "war chests" which could be used to incur 
       political debts from legislators who are aided by the 
       contributions. See United States v. United Automobile 
       Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 579, 77 S.Ct. 529, 535, 1 
       L.Ed.2d 563 (1957). The second purpose of the 
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       provisions, the government argues, is to protect the 
       individuals who have paid money into a corporation or 
       union for purposes other than the support of 
       candidates from having that money used to support 
       political candidates to whom they may be opposed. See 
       United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 
       1353, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948). We agree with the 
       government that these purposes are sufficient to justify 
       the regulation at issue. 
 
Id. at 207-08. See also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l 
Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) (stating that 
NRWC upheld "the prohibition of corporate campaign 
contributions to political candidates"). 
 
Although S 441b(a) was not directly at issue in NRWC, 
the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have read NRWC  to uphold 
the constitutionality of its ban on contributions from 
corporate treasuries. See Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. 
Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 645-46 (6th Cir. 1997); Athens Lumber 
Co., Inc. v. FEC, 718 F.2d 363, 363 (11th Cir. 1983) (en 
banc). There is some room for doubt as to whether the 
Court can be said to have held squarely that the ban in 
S 441b(a) is constitutional. NRWC stated that "We are also 
convinced that the statutory prohibitions and exceptions 
we have considered are sufficiently tailored to these 
purposes to avoid undue restriction on the associational 
interests asserted by respondent." Id. at 208 (emphasis 
added). Moreover, the first purpose identified by the Court 
--limiting the effect of the advantage flowing from the 
corporate form--could be met by a limit on contributions 
from corporate treasuries instead of a ban; and the second 
purpose could perhaps be addressed in corporate charters 
and state laws regulating corporations. Nevertheless, we 
feel constrained to read NRWC, and the Court's statements 
on NRWC in Nat'l Conservative PAC, as at least strong 
suggestions that S 441b(a) is constitutional. 
 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990), which upheld a Michigan statute that prohibited 
corporations from using corporate funds for independent 
expenditures in support of or in opposition to candidates 
for state office, also implies that the flat ban in S 441b(a) is 
constitutional. The analysis proceeds from Buckley, which 
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distinguished independent expenditures from contributions: 
"[A]lthough the Act's contribution and expenditure 
limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment 
interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more 
severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political 
expression and association than do its limitations on 
financial contributions." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23. Austin 
upheld a ban on independent expenditures from the 
corporate treasury because it found the ban sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to the purpose of limiting the influence of 
the unique state-conferred benefit of the corporate 
structure, which allows corporations to amass large 
treasuries. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660-61. Because 
Buckley treats limits on independent expenditures as more 
severe than limits on contributions, Austin suggests that a 
ban on contributions from the corporate treasury also 
would be constitutional if sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
achieve the goal. 
 
Austin also counsels that the ban on contributions from 
the corporate treasury here is sufficiently narrowly tailored 
to the interest of limiting the influence of corporate 
treasuries amassed under the state-conferred corporate 
structure. Austin reasoned that the Michigan statute 
prohibiting independent expenditures by corporations was 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to its purpose because, by 
permitting corporations to make independent political 
expenditures from separate segregated funds, it avoided an 
absolute ban on all forms of corporate political spending. 
See 494 U.S. at 660-61. The FECA also permits such 
indirect corporate political expenditures (via soft money), 
and under the teachings of Austin would thus seem to be 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. 
 
We are mindful that the flat ban on corporate 
contributions has never been directly addressed by a 
holding of the Supreme Court, and that this issue involves 
important First Amendment values. Because of the strong 
implication we draw from NRCW, Nat'l Conservative PAC, 
and Austin, however, we feel compelled to reject Mariani's 
facial challenge to S 441b(a). It will be for the Supreme 
Court itself to decide otherwise. 
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B. Section 441b(a) and Soft Money 
 
The second challenge Mariani raises with respect to 
S 441b(a) is that the development of issue advocacy and the 
prevalence of soft money in campaigns for federal office has 
so eroded the theoretical distinction between hard and soft 
money that any justification for the ban on contributions 
from corporate treasuries has been vitiated. Mariani argues 
that under present conditions the ban cannot advance a 
compelling state interest and therefore must be invalidated. 
Significantly, Mariani does not complain thatS 441b(a) 
itself fails to ban contributions from corporate treasuries. 
Rather, he argues that under the FECA--as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court and FEC regulations--it is possible for 
corporations to accomplish through other means that 
which they cannot accomplish through direct contributions 
from corporate treasuries. Mariani contends that, by 
funding soft money issue advocacy, contributors come so 
close to accomplishing what they would accomplish by hard 
money campaign contributions that the two are basically 
indistinguishable in terms of the danger they pose of 
corrupting the political process. 
 
This contention amounts to an argument that S 441b(a) 
does too little by way of banning corporate political 
spending and is thereby fatally underinclusive. The 
Supreme Court has made clear, however, that Congress 
can act incrementally in this and other areas. See Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 105 ("[A] statute is not invalid under the 
constitution because it might have gone farther than it 
did.") (citations omitted). As we have explained in a case 
regarding solicitation of campaign funds by a candidate for 
judicial office, the government may "take steps, albeit tiny 
ones, that only partially solve a problem without totally 
eradicating it." Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme 
Court of Penn., 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
The underinclusiveness analysis employed for First 
Amendment questions does not change this principle. The 
First Amendment requires that the rule chosen must"fit" 
the asserted goals, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993), and it must also strike an 
appropriate balance between achieving those goals and 
protecting constitutional rights. Underinclusiveness 
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analysis serves to "ensure that the proffered state interest 
actually underlies the law," Austin, 494 U.S. at 677 
(Brennan, J., concurring). But a rule fails the test only if it 
cannot "fairly be said to advance any genuinely substantial 
governmental interest," Federal Communication Comm'n v. 
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 396 (1984), 
because it provides only "ineffective or remote" support for 
the asserted goals, id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)), or 
"the most limited incremental" support, Bolger v. Youngs 
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983). 
 
Thus, First Amendment underinclusiveness analysis 
requires neither a perfect nor even the best available fit 
between means and ends. See City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1986) (zoning ordinance 
regulating adult theaters was not constitutionally 
underinclusive "in that it fail[ed] to regulate other kinds of 
adult businesses . . . We simply have no basis on this 
record for assuming that Renton will not, in the future, 
amend its ordinance to include other kinds of adult 
businesses."). See also Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[A] regulation is not fatally underinclusive 
simply because an alternative regulation, which would 
restrict more or the speech of more people could be more 
effective. The First Amendment does not require the 
government to curtail as much speech as may conceivably 
serve its goals."). 
 
Applying this standard, section 441b(a) is not fatally 
underinclusive. The regulation in Fed. Communications 
Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 397, which 
banned editorial speech by station management, but not 
editorial control over the content of programs and guests on 
news programs, was struck down because it did "virtually 
nothing" to prevent noncommercial stations from serving as 
outlets for expression of narrow partisan views. In contrast, 
S 441b(a) prevents corporations from donating hard money 
entirely. The important theoretical differences between hard 
and soft money, which include that a candidate cannot 
directly control how to spend soft money, are intended to 
avoid the corrupting influence of large contributors 
supporting a particular candidate. The practical 
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distinctions between hard and soft money may have 
diminished in the past decade with the rise of issue 
advocacy, but not to such an extent that we can say that 
there is no benefit from distinguishing between the two. If 
hard and soft money were equivalent, it would be hard to 
imagine why Mariani would have gone to the lengths he 
allegedly went to in order to give hard money instead of 
soft. 
 
Mariani attempts to counter this analysis by citing to 
United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 
454 (1995): 
 
       [w]hen the Government defends a regulation on speech 
       as a means to . . . prevent anticipated harms, it must 
       do more than simply `posit the existence of the disease 
       sought to be cured.' . . . It must demonstrate that the 
       recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that 
       the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a 
       direct and material way. 
 
Id. at 475 (quoting Turner Broadcasting System v. Fed. 
Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)). The 
underinclusiveness analysis explicated above is not 
inconsistent with National Treasury Employees Union. 
Congress may regulate speech so long as it demonstrates 
that the recited harms are real, and it may, consistent with 
that principle, choose to regulate just some part of that 
speech. The requirement that the regulation alleviate the 
harm in a direct and material way is not a requirement that 
it redress the harm completely. And in light of the broad 
language in NRWC regarding the legitimacy of Congress's 
purpose in enacting S 441b(a), it is simply too late in the 
day to argue that Congress has failed to demonstrate that 
the recited harms are real. 
 
Congress might well have concluded that direct 
contributions from corporate treasuries were more 
important to regulate than expenditures or contributions 
made through committees, because hard money can be 
used by a candidate in more and different ways than soft 
money. We note that no party to this case has argued that 
there is no compelling government interest in banning 
contributions from corporations. Indeed, Mariani's 
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argument that the rise of soft money fatally undermines the 
purpose of S 441b(a) seems to depend on the assumption 
that limiting corporate contributions--if done effectively-- 
would be constitutionally valid. 
 
V. The Challenge to S 441f 
 
Section 441f provides that "[n]o person shall make a 
contribution in the name of another person or knowingly 
permit his name to be used to effect such a contribution, 
and no person shall knowingly accept a contribution made 
by one person in the name of another person." 2 U.S.C. 
S 441f. Mariani argues that the prohibition inS 441f on 
contributions in the name of another to candidates for 
federal elective office violates the First Amendment because 
it fails to advance any compelling state interest and 
because it is underinclusive since it only applies to 
contributions of hard money (and can be circumvented by 
donating soft money). 
 
The Buckley Court accorded broad acceptance to the 
FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements, explaining 
that they impose "only a marginal restriction upon the 
contributor's ability to engage in free communication." 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976). Although 
acknowledging the dangers of compelled disclosure of 
political activity, the Court found that the governmental 
interests in disclosure were of such magnitude that the 
requirements passed the strict test established by NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court accepted as 
compelling three purposes behind the disclosure 
requirement: to provide the electorate with information as 
to where political campaign money comes from and how it 
is spent by the candidate in order to aid the voters in 
evaluating those who seek federal office; to deter actual or 
apparent corruption; and to gather the data necessary to 
detect violations of the contribution limits. Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 66-68. 
 
Buckley carefully considered the danger posed by 
compelled disclosure. It held that the state interests 
promoted by the FECA's reporting and disclosure 
requirements justified the indirect burden imposed on First 
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Amendment interests, and that the compelled disclosure 
requirements were constitutional in the absence of a 
"reasonable probability" that disclosures would subject 
their contributors to "threats, harassment, or reprisals." Id. 
at 74. Proscription of conduit contributions (with the 
concomitant requirement that the true source of 
contributions be disclosed) would seem to be at the very 
core of the Court's analysis. In light of Buckley, we reject 
Mariani's argument that S 441f fails to advance a 
compelling state interest. 
 
We also conclude that Congress's decision to limit the 
disclosure requirement to contributions of hard money does 
not make the requirement fatally underinclusive. Mariani's 
argument that the disclosure requirement is fatally 
underinclusive is similar to his argument that S 441b(a) has 
been undermined by the rise of soft money. As with that 
challenge, however, we conclude that Congress was free to 
determine that disclosure of hard money donations was the 
most important form of disclosure, and to limit the 
regulation to that area. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject Mariani's challenges 
to SS 441b(a) and 441f. Judgment will be entered in favor of 
the government. 
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